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Appellee ( Plaintiff below) .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appeal from the Monroe
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The Honorable
James M. Dixon
Judge

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the stipulated evidence is sufficient to support

the conviction for disorderly conduct when cqnsidered in light
of constitutional limitations on criminal sanctions against
speech activities.
2.

Whether the charging affidavit was defective so as to

prejudice the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 14, 1970, in the Bloomington City Court, appellant
Gregory Hess (hereafter referred· to as Hess) was charged by
affidavit with disorderly conduct .

(Tr. p. 1).

A Motion to

Quash was filed on May 28, 1970, and overruled on June 3, 1970 .
A plea of not guilty was entered .

The case went to trial in

City Court on Octobe r 29 , 1970 , resulting in a finding that Hess
was guilty.

An appeal was taken to the Monroe Superior Court .

(Tr. pp. 2 , 39).
A stipulation of facts was entered in the Superior Court .
The pleadings filed in the Superior Court were a Statement of
the Case on Appeal, containing the facts as stipulated (Tr . pp .
39 , 3-6) , a Memorandum in Support of Appeal (Tr. pp. 39 , 20-30) ,
and an Answer to Memorandum of Appeal .

(Tr . pp . 39 , 31) .

Judgment was entered on July 19, 1971 , as fol l ows :
"This cause having been submitted to this
Court for trial on Stipulated Facts agreed
to by the defendant and the State of Indiana ,
and the Court having examined the Memoranda
of Counsel and now being duly advised in the
premises , now finds the defendant guilty of
the charge of Disorderly Conduct (Burns' Ind .
Statu tes Annotated , Section 10-1510) ; and ,
the Court having found the defendant guilty
as charged, now assesses a fine of $1 . 00,
plus the costs of this action and the defendant is now granted sixty (60) days to pay
said fine and costs , as assessed , or in lieu
thereof , to file his Motion to Correct Errors .
Judgment . (Tr. p . 39)
A Motion for Clarification of Judgment was filed on July
22 , 1971.

(Tr. pp . 39, 32) .

filed on September 16, 1971 .

A Motion to Correct Errors was
(Tr. pp. 39 , 33-38).

The Motion

to Correct Errors was overruled on September 22 , 1971, at
which time the Superior Court granted the Motion for Clarification of Judgment by advising that "the statement made by the
defendant shortly before his arrest:
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'We ' ll take the fucking

street later (or again)' is a statement that has a tendency to
lead to violence and is in violation of the disorderl y conduct
statute of t he State of Indiana regardless of whether or not the
vulgar modifier was used in said statement. "

(Tr. p. 39) .

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant sets out
the stipulated facts and is accepted as correct by the State .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The elements of the offense of disorderly conduct are:
1.

Action in a loud and boisterous manner

2.

Which by its nature is offensive so as to
be a disturbance of the peace and guiet of
the neighborhood .

3.

Which action , if consisting of a speech
related acti vity, must have a tendency
to lead to violence.

The evidence as stipulated proves each of these elements
and further shows a clear and present danger that violence might
result from the activity.

The facts show a riot or at least near-

riot in progress, with Hess shouting encouragement to the rioters
just when the disturbance appeared about to be put down .
The statute provides sufficient fair notice of the conduct
prohibited as not to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad .
Perfect precision of language is not required .
The Motion to Quash presents no issue to the Court .

It is

not clear that the motion was ever filed in the Superior Court .
-
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Any error in the City Court is wiped out by the provision for
trial de novo .

It is difficult to believe that Hess went into

the Superior Court unaware of the nature of the charges and
evidence against him , since the case was heard on a stipulated
record .
ARGUMENT

I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VALIDITY OF THE
CONVICTION AND MEETS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This section of argument is in answer to two of Hess' arguments and three of h is issues .

The argument is consolidated since

the matte r s to be discussed overlap, particularly in light of the
stipulation as t o the facts and the prior court decisions interpreting the statutory language .
The statute invol ved in I . C. 1971 , 35-27-2-1 , as found in
Burns' (1971 Supp.) §10-1510 , which provides as follows :
" Disorderly conduct - - Penalty .- -Whoever
shall act in a loud , boisterous or
disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace
and quiet of any neighborhood or family , by
loud or unusual noise , or by tumultuous or
offensive behavior , threatening , traducing ,
quarreling , challenging to fight or fighting ,
shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct,
and upon conviction, shall be fined in any
sum not exceedin~ five hundred dollars ($500)
to which may be added imprisonment for not
to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days.''
That statutory language has been i nterpreted by the Court as to
cases, such as the one at bar, in which the activity shown a s a
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violation is one of "pure speech . "
The statute was considered and thoroughly analyzed in Whited
v . State (1971),

Ind.

, 269 N. E. 2d 149 .

That analysis was

affirmed by the Court in Miller v . State (1972) ,
N.E.2d 222 .

I nd .

279

The elements of the offense as derived therefrom might

be stated as:
1.

Action in a loud and boisterous manner

2.

Which by its nature is offensive so as
to be a disturbance of the peace and
quiet of the neighborhood .

3.

Which action, if consisting of a speech
related activity, must have a tendency
to lead to violence .

The stipulated facts show that Hess was acting in a loud
manner .

Sheriff Thrasher , Bernice S lutsky and Lela Donnelly

each testified that Hess' statement was made i n a loud voice .
(The fact that others were also acting in a loud manner is not
relevant to the issue of Hess' conviction but relates only to
whether other persons present at the time might also have been
guilty of disorderly conduct . )
Cons ideration of whether his manner was boisterous, whether
the action was of such a nature as would disturb the peace and
quiet of the neighborhood, and whether the speech was such as
to have a tendency to lead to violence are all dependent on the
same facts in thi s case.

A brief restatement of those facts

clearly shows that these elements were proved.
The incidents leading to the arrest began with a disturbance
on the campus of Indiana University in which a mob of two to
- 5 -

three hundred people were gathered.
building were being blocked.

The entries of a public

It is not clear from the record

how many of the mob were participating in the blockage of the
entryway and how many were onlookers.

The Sheriff's office,

city police and campus police then cleared the entry .
students were arre sted.

Two

About 100 to 150 of the mob then blocked

the street in what appears to have been an attempt to prevent
the removal of the arrested students .

The officials then cleared

the street .
At that point Hess, in a loud voice, made a statement about
retaking control of the street.

The language used , according to

Hess' expert on language usage, was such as woula demonstrate
group identification and show oppos ition to the actions of the
police authorities .
the sidewalk .

At the time , Hess was facing the crowd on

(Tr . pp . 3-5) .

It can be said , then, that Hess made a statement which by
its terms would appear to be an incitement to further opposition
to the authorities in a si tuat ion that either was an actual riot
or so clearl y on the verge of one as to make a discussion of
those semantics immaterial .

The action can thus be said to have

been in a boisterous manner .
The incident in which Hess was a participant and of which
his statement was a part clearly was a disturbance of the peace
and quiet of the neighborhood .

While the campus of a major

university may not be the serene and cloistered place whi ch is
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pictured in the ideals of academic life, neither is it

often

a place where anarchy should reign and all rules of law be
waived.

Street riots are by their very nature disturbing.

The

holding of Whited~- State, supra , that it is the nature of the
action , and not testimony by any particular person that he was
disturbed , which is the necessaiy · element of the offense, must
again be noted.
The third element deals with the vital issue of the right
of free speech as guaranteed by our State and Federal constitutions .

These constitutional guarantees limit the scope of

criminal laws prohibiting speech related activities, but do not
constitute an absolute bar to such prohib ition .
Hess suggests three elements within this element; that is,
it is argued that any law making such speech activities a criminal
act must meet three criteria:
1.

Advocacy of force or law violation;

2.

directed to inciting imminent lawless
action;

3.

under such circumstances as are likely
to produce such action . (Brief of Appellant,
p. 19).

These criteria are taken from Brandenburg y. Ohio (1969) , 395
U.S . 444, 89 S.Ct . 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, which involved a conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute for speech activi ties referring to a theoretical possibility of violent action
at an indeterminate fut ure date .
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Despite Hess' attempt to explain away the language used in
the stateme nt , a shouted message to a mob that ''We'll take the
fucking street again'' can most reasonab ly be interpre ted as
encourag ement not to give up the struggle against the authori~
ties .

That a person is nervous and excited at a time he commits

a crimina l act is ordinar ily not a defense , not is his subjective mental state , except in cases of insanity , an issue to
be conside red.
As pointed out above, any necessa ry showing of a clear and
present danger of violence resultin g is provide d by the fact that
a riot-typ e situatio n then existed and was jus t then in the process of being quelled by the authori ties . If there were ever a
situatio n i n which a likeliho od of violenc e would result, the
case at bar present s that situatio n .
Nor does the apparen t fact that no further violence resulted
require reversa l of the convict ion .

No authori ty is cited by

Hess for the position that violenc e must actually result .

The

law at most requires a likeliho od, and that was present here . It
might be specula ted that had Hess been allowed to continu e his
advocac y , rather than being promptl y arrested , then further
violenc e might we ll have ensued,

Surely a law enforcem ent

officia l is not required to wait until a tense situatio n such
as this actually explode s before he can deal with the person
inciting it .
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A proper showing was made, by the stipulated facts of the
case, of all the elements which might possibly be required to be
proved.

There is thus no failure of proof or violation of first

amendment freedoms .
Hess also argues that the statute is unconstitionally vague
by arguing that under dictionary definitions of each word
individually there might be some question as to what is covered .
"The applicable standard, however, is not
one of wholly consistent academic definition of abstract terms . It is, rather, the
practical criterion of fair notice to those
to whom the statute is directed." American
Communication Association v. Douds(1950),
339 u.s. 382, 412 70 s . ct.-674, 691.
That some individual will for some reason claim not to
understand the meaning of a statute is not sufficient to make it
unconstitutionally vague .
"Mere difficulty in ascertaining its
meaning or the fact that it is susceptible
of different interpretations will not
render it nugatory . Doubts as to its
proper construction will not j u stify us
in disregarding it . " State v. Rice ( 1956)
235 Ind . 423, 134 N.E.Zd 2197
The United States Supreme Court has also spoken on the
standards of the required degree of definiteness.

In Roth v.

U.S . (1957) 354 U.S . 476, 491, 77 S.Ct . 1304, 1312, that court
stated:
"The thrust of the argument is that these
words are not sufficiently precise because
they do not mean the same thing to all
people, all the time, everywhere .

-
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* * *
This Court , however, has consistently
he l d t hat lack of precision is not
itself offensive to the requirements
of due process . "
The Roth opinion was considered and quoted at length in Strou d
v. State (19 71) ,

Ind .

, 273 N. E. 2d 842 ,

In an earlier case , the United States Sup reme Court stated:
"But few words possess the precision of
mathematical symbols, most s tatutes must
deal with untold and unforseen variations
in factual situations , an d the practical
necessities of discharging the busines s
of government inevitably limit the specificity
with which legislators can spe ll out pro hibitions . Consequently , no more than a
reasonab l e degree of certaint y can be demanded . "
Boyce Mot0r Lines~- U. S . (1952) , 342 U. S.
337, 340, 72 S.Ct . 329 .
It i s s ubmitted that, under these s tandards, the d isorderl y
conduct statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad .
It wo uld further be noted that , in considering any al leged
"chilling effect" on freedom of speech, the statute must be considered in light of the i nte rpretation p l aced on i t by the Court
in Whited, s upra .
II
THE CHARGING AFFIDAVI T WAS SUFFICIENT
No issue is presented for decision by the Court a s to the
alleged defects in the indictment .
ruling on his Motion to Quash.
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Hess' argument goes to the

That Motion was filed in the City Court and overruled
there .

That ruling pres ents nothing for review .

An appeal from

a City Court to a court of general jurisdiction i s a trial de
novo, and any error in the court of limited juris diction is thus
immaterial.

State v. Kutter (1878), 59 Ind . 572 .

(Appeals

from a City Court are under the same law a s appeals from a
jus tice of the peace, as was involved in Kutter .

I.C . 1971,

35-1-13-3, as found in Burns (1971 Supp . ) §9 - 721).
The record does not s how that a new Motion to Quas h was
filed in Superior Court .

The record does show as part of the

Statement of Case on Appeal from City Court on Stipulated
Record the following:
"Prior to the entry of hi s plea of not guilty
in the City Court, the defendant filed a
motion to quash the affidavit on the ground
that it failed to charge the offense with
sufficient certainty, and on the ground that
the disorderly conduct statute (hereinafter
cited as Section 10-1510) is unconst i tutional
on its face . A copy of thi s motion to quash
the affidavit and the supporting memorandum
are attached and made a part of this record."
(Tr . p . 3) .
The State is unable to reconstruct the events and under standings surrounding the preparation of this Statement of Cas e .
It is possible that this statement was intended to be a refiling
of the motion in Superior Court, although it would appear that
the Superior Court must not have so understood it, since there
is no ruling thereon.
Hes s ' argument i s stated in very gene ral terms and no t
related to the facts of this cas e.
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There is no showing of any

prejudice to Gregory Hess in the Monroe Superior Court .

Under

the facts of this case there could be no poss ible prejudice .
Hess ' argument may fairly be condensed to his citation
to Loveless v. State ( 1960), 240 Ind. 534, 539 , 1 66 N. E.2d
864 , 866 :

"A defendant is entitled to be informed
specifically of the crimes charged and not
come to trial in the dark and uninformed as
to the nature of tFie evfaence a gains t him-:"'"
"[emphasis addeaT. - The issue then is one of fair notice to the defendant and the
avoidance of surprise.
There is no allegation in this case that Hess lacked
knowledge of the nature of the charges and evidence against .
Indeed , the case was heard on a stipulation of the evidence .
Any claim of ignorance would thus be incredible.

No issue is

presented for consideration by this Cour t, since this Court
does not render advisory opinions on abstract issues not presented in the cas~ before it .
CONCLUS I ON
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Monroe
Superior Court should be affirmed .
Respectfully submitted,
THEODORE L. SENDAK
Attorney General of Indiana
DARREL K. DIAMOND

Deputy Attorney Gener al
Attorneys for Appellee
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